



The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ report (RtP) has been hailed by academics and policymakers alike as an 
important policy development in the international community’s potential to protect vulnerable and 
insecure populations from violence.  This paper critically assesses the RtP, examining the problems with 
its particular conception of justice and security, based on the nature and source of threats to individuals.  
This paper criticises the RtP’s focus on crises, arguing that this focus downplays the importance of 
systemic, ‘chronic’, problems of injustice and disorder across the globe – and thus the importance of 
responding to these chronic problems.  This, together with the RtP’s focus on civil and political rights 
over socioeconomic rights, results in the causes of crises being perceived as local, obviating the need 
for admitting the role of the international community in contributing to current crises and systemic 
injustices.  Based on these criticisms, the paper concludes that the RtP’s narrow conception of the 
relationship between justice and security will not further the international community’s ability to 
discharge its responsibility towards individuals across the globe.     
Policy Implications 
The RtP’s idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ places the blame for crises involving mass-atrocity 
crimes solely on the government of the state in which the crisis occurs. 
Protecting populations from harm – the key aim of the RtP – requires a broader understanding of the 
relationship between mass-atrocity crimes and poverty and inequality, including an understanding of 
the international community’s role in creating the conditions in which these crimes occur. 
To be effective, a policy aiming to protect populations from harm requires a reorientation of 
priorities away from military interventions into crisis situations, and towards redressing structural, 
systemic causes of crises before they occur. In addition to development issues such as health and 
education, these might include restrictions upon arms sales and corporate activities in unstable 
regions, and a focus on nonmilitary, more consensual, diplomatic peace efforts. 
Addressing structural global inequality does not require a policy document such as the RtP. It adds 
little to the existing humanitarian intervention debate and detracts global attention and effort from 
addressing poverty and inequality. 
The RtP should not be implemented any further, either by civil-society groups seeking to gather 
support for the doctrine or by the UN Security Council in its resolutions. 
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1 The Responsibility to Protect: progress towards justice? 
‘The developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from 
wholesale slaughter ... is an evolution we should welcome ... Because, despite its limitations 
and imperfections, it is a testimony to a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering 
in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it.’ (Annan, 1999a.)   
In the 11 years since its inception as a policy which would enable the international community to better 
respond to individuals suffering in civil wars, state collapse and repression, the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ (RtP) has now been hailed as coming of age in 2011, when it ‘enabled the world to prevent a 
massacre in Benghazi’ (Adams, 2012).  After the ‘early years’ when the RtP was discussed and defined, 
and after its reference in three UN resolutions and statements between 2005-2010, in 2011 it was 
referred to in 6 UN resolutions – ‘in the glacial world of global diplomacy, this represents momentous 
progress’ (Adams, 2012).  Is this a testimony to a humanity that cares more and will do more to end 
suffering? 
This paper critically examines the RtP policy doctrine, highlighting some problems with its conception 
of the relationship between justice and security.  It contends that, despite the RtP’s claims that its 
reconception of sovereignty has overcome the deadlock in the humanitarian intervention debate, the 
same problematic conception of justice and its relationship to security arises in relation to the RtP as 
with humanitarian intervention.  Section 2 thus considers the nature of justice inherent in ethical 
arguments given in support of the practice of humanitarian intervention and in claims of the increasing 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international society.  Section 3 addresses the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine arguing that, despite claims that the RtP is revolutionary, it makes 
the same problematic assumptions about the injustices suffered by individuals across the globe.  These 
problems stem from a focus on crises of civil and political rights abuses committed (or allowed to occur) 
by a government against its own population.  Section 4 explores the problems with this conception of 
justice, starting with the assumption of progress in the field of international peace and security.  The 
paper argues that this obscures the narrow view of justice taken in this narrative, and fails to 
comprehend the importance of systemic injustices in addition to crises, particularly those arising from 
socioeconomic issues such as poverty and inequality.  These problems cannot so easily be attributed 
to local governmental failures, from which the international community can ‘rescue’ individuals, but 
point towards the potential role of the international community in creating these conditions of 
injustice and insecurity.  The paper does not argue that the RtP should include a wider conception of 
justice within its remit, enabling intervention of various kinds in relation to issues of global poverty 
and inequality.  Acknowledging that the RtP is only intended to address core international crimes 
rather than solving all the ills of the world, Section 5 nevertheless concludes that, despite its claims to 
be a human-centred policy that enables the international community to act in the face of great 
injustice, the RtP’s narrow view of the causes of and solutions to global insecurity will mean that it will 
fail to help achieve justice for individuals across the globe. 
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2 Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect 
Following a long history of ‘just war theory’ attempting to establish when and how it might be 
legitimate to wage war (in the absence of legal constraints) (Chesterman, 2003, p.11; Evans, 2005, 
pp.2-3; Bellamy, 2006, pp.8-9), a more recent development has been the consideration of whether 
‘humanitarian’ reasons could constitute a just cause for war and a legitimate (or even lawful) exception 
to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force in Article 2.4 (eg Davenport, 2011, pp.513-515).  
Admitting that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ might seem to some ‘an obscene oxymoron’, Jeff 
Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane use the following definition: 
the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of 
individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose 
territory force is applied.  (Hozgrefe, 2003, p.18)  
Literature in both the disciplines of international law and international relations addresses 
aspects such as whether war can ever be ‘humanitarian’ (eg Booth, 2002; Atak, 2002) and whether 
humanitarian intervention is or should be a legal concept and a further exception to the UN Charter’s 
prohibition on the use of force contained within Article 2(4) (in addition to self-defence and the 
Security Council’s collective security powers) (eg Glennon, 1999; Buchanan, 2003; Chesterman, 2003).  
Two particular aspects of this literature will be examined here.  The first is the nature of the ethical 
arguments in favour of the practice of humanitarian intervention; the second is the search for empirical 
evidence demonstrating an increasing solidarity in relation to acceptance of humanitarian intervention 
in international society. Section 4 then demonstrates how these reveal a problematic understanding 
of the conception of justice. 
The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention 
Fernando Teson’s case for allowing states a right of humanitarian intervention under international law 
is based on ‘a standard assumption of liberal political philosophy’ – that ‘a major purpose of states and 
governments is to protect and secure human rights’ (1995; 2003, p.93).  Those in power who violate 
these rights, the argument goes, undermine their right to exercise power and so should not be allowed 
to do so.  Teson argues that we all have the obligation to respect (and promote respect for) human 
rights and, in exercise of this obligation, we can be obliged to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy 
whose human rights are being violated, using force if necessary (2003, p.2).  In not intervening, ‘we 
deny, not only the centrality of justice in political affairs but also the common humanity that binds us 
all’ (Teson, 2003, p.54).  It is tyranny and anarchy (both opposites of democracy) that are the worst 
forms of injustice to individuals, he argues, because it is in these situations that the worst human rights 
abuses occur – including crimes against humanity, mass murder, genocide and widespread torture 
(Teson, 2003, p.8).  Democracy, or at least free and fair elections, appears to be to Teson the most 
fundamental of rights, because he sees it as the basis of the enjoyment of all other human rights (1995, 
p.332).  As against these horrific violations of fundamental human rights, the non-intervention rules 
of the UN Charter are unacceptable.  Michael Glennon blames an outdated international legal system 
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for not allowing humanitarian intervention in cases such as Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda when, he claims, 
‘the international community stepped in to halt the slaughter of civilians’ (1999, p.5).1  Similarly, in 
relation to the US invasion of Panama in 1989 which overthrew General Noriega, Anthony D’Amato 
describes scholars who maintain the importance of the UN Charter’s non-intervention principles as ‘so 
conditioned by a statist conception of international law that they seem unable to see through the 
abstraction that we call the “state” to the reality of human beings struggling to achieve basic freedoms’ 
(1990, p.516).  Teson, D’Amato and Glennon all pose a vision of an outdated statist interpretation of 
international law set against a more inclusive international law or morality that takes account of 
achieving justice for individuals.  Glennon makes an explicit reference to justice in relation to Kosovo, 
saying ‘justice (as it is now understood) and the UN Charter seemed to collide’ (1999, p.1)  when NATO 
members feared that Russia would block Security Council authorisation of the use of force against 
Slobodan Milosevic – justice was thus served by NATO’s intervention without Security Council 
authorisation.  Then-Secretary General Kofi Annan echoed this tension between states’ and individuals’ 
rights in his claim that: 
states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not 
vice versa ... When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is 
to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. (1999b, pp.49-50, 
cited by Weiss 2007, p.96.) 
The moral view underlying such arguments is clear – individuals are at the core of international 
society and the international legal system, and a state which grossly violates its citizens’ civil and 
political rights does not deserve the benefit of the UN Charter rules on non-intervention and non-use 
of force.  These moral arguments have been accompanied by work which assesses whether these 
ethical arguments have gained ground and resulted in humanitarian intervention being viewed as a 
more legitimate practice in international society since the end of the Cold War; it is to this argument 
which the paper now turns. 
Humanitarian Intervention: a legitimate practice? 
Rather than relying on a particular moral argument, some scholars have addressed the empirical 
evidence of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international society (eg Malanczuk, 1993; 
Wheeler, 2000; Chesterman, 2002; Kahler, 2011).  Nicholas Wheeler’s assessment of Cold War 
interventions which could have been viewed as humanitarian by their outcomes (India-East Pakistan 
in 1971, Vietnam-Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania-Uganda in 1979) concludes that there was no 
solidarity among states as to the legitimacy of any humanitarian credentials these interventions might 
have had (Wheeler 2000, p.130).  Post-Cold War, however, he argues that the situation became more 
complex, turning on Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and the role of the Security Council in intervening 
in the internal matters of member states.  If an internal situation of human rights abuses was judged 
by the Security Council to be a threat to international peace and security, then intervention to halt this 
abuse was more likely to be seen as legitimate by international society (2000, p.139).  Following the 
establishment of ‘no fly zones’ by a Western coalition as a result of the designation by Security Council 
Resolution 688 of the trans-boundary consequences of Iraq’s repression of the Kurds as a threat to 
international peace and security (2000, p.145; p.169) in 1991, in 1992 all 15 Security Council members 
were in favour of the US (and UN) intervention to provide humanitarian relief in Somalia, even in the 
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absence of the host state’s consent (Wheeler 2000, p.185; Malanczuk 1993, p.30).  In relation to 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, undertaken without Security Council authorisation, Wheeler argues 
that ‘for the first time since the founding of the Charter, seven members either legitimated, excused 
or acquiesced in the use of force justified on humanitarian grounds.’ (2000, p.281).  Whilst Wheeler 
does not go as far as some legal scholars in asserting an emerging or established legal norm (eg 
D’Amato 1990, p.520; p.523; Alexander, 2000; D’Amato, 2001), he does find increasing legitimacy with 
regard to humanitarian intervention in international society, at least where the Security Council has 
found a threat to international peace and security.  This description of the increasing legitimacy of the 
idea of humanitarian intervention suggests that the ‘international community’ is becoming more open 
to acting to protect the individual and their civil and political rights, and that this represents significant 
progress towards achieving justice for individuals across the globe.  This narrative of progress towards 
justice will be examined in Section 4. 
Because the idea of humanitarian intervention does notfind explicit expression in the UN Charter, a 
‘deadlock’ between human rights and non-intervention characterised the humanitarian intervention 
debate for some time – with arguments in favour of a legal right of humanitarian intervention based 
on the ‘trumping’ of non-intervention by human rights; and arguments against based on the protection 
offered by non-intervention rule against the pursuit of national interest (Welsh, Thiekling and 
Mcfarlane, 2001).2  It was in the context of this deadlock that the idea of a ‘responsibility to protect’ 
arose; and this article now moves on to consider this doctrine. 
 
3 The Responsibility to Protect: an endorsement of ‘responsible 
sovereignty’? 
In 1996 Francis Deng and others first drew attention to the idea of sovereignty as responsibility (Deng 
et al, 1996), in the context of humanitarian crises.  After Kofi Annan’s 1999 ‘Two Concepts of 
Sovereignty’ speech and article in which he challenged the idea of sovereignty as non-intervention, 
Annan again challenged this deadlock in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, when 
he asked 
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we react to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
affect every precept of our common humanity? (Annan, 2000.) 
In 2000, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was 
convened to consult with NGOs, academics and policy think tanks in order to consider ‘how to move 
from polemics – and often paralysis – to action’ (ICISS, 2001).  In 2001 it produced its report, the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’.  The RtP outlines the changing international context leading up to the 
production of the report in a section entitled ‘Human Rights and Emerging Practice’, where the 
importance of the individual is evidenced by the increasing number of human rights treaties since the 
end of World War II (including the Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention 
Against Torture and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women) 
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(2001, p.16), but notes that ‘millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, 
state repression and state collapse’ (2001, p.11).  The heart of the RtP doctrine is a challenge to 
traditional conceptions of sovereignty as the exclusive control over a state’s territory and a re-
conception of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility towards a state’s population (2001, p.12; Deng 
et al. 1996, p.xviii; p.1; p.6).  The primary responsibility for a people lies with the government of that 
state, but if the 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. (2001, p.xi.) 
The idea of the responsibility to protect was endorsed by the General Assembly at the UN’s 
2005 World Summit where, Wheeler says, in relation to certain atrocities, ‘190 states committed 
themselves to the principle that the rule of non-intervention was not sacrosanct’ (2005, p.97).  It was 
claimed that, had it existed at the time, the doctrine could have prevented the tragedies of Rwanda 
and Srebrenica (Wheeler 2005, p.97, citing Straw, 2005).  It should be noted that the General 
Assembly’s World Summit Outcome Document did not adopt the entire text of the ICISS’ report – 
paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document noted each state’s responsibility to protect its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (not a new international 
legal obligation) and paragraph 139 refers to the responsibility of the international community, using 
peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter, to help protect populations.  
This paragraph also referred to the international community’s willingness to take collective action in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter should a state ‘manifestly fail’ to protect its population.  In 
relation to the international community’s willingness to use force in carrying out its responsibility to 
protect, the summit document recommended that the General Assembly consider the responsibility 
to protect populations, ‘bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law’ (UN, 2005).  
This is a somewhat cautious approach to the detailed content of the full RtP report.  Nonetheless, 
although the Security Council’s powers to authorise intervention still rest in Chapter VII’s conception 
of threats to international peace and security, the RtP can be seen as an endorsement of the Council’s 
widening tendency to refer to human rights abuses in authorising Chapter VII actions.  Recent 
examples include Security Council resolutions 1970 (26 February 2011) and 1973 (17 March 2011) 
relating to Libya, which referred to the Gaddafi Government’s responsibility to protect the Libyan 
population when authorising NATO action under Chapter VII of the Charter.  As such, the ideas within 
RtP could be argued to be gaining increasing legitimacy within international society, even in the 
‘watered-down’ form accepted by the General Assembly rather than the full ICISS report. 
Justice in the Responsibility to Protect  
With its reconception of sovereignty as responsibility, the RtP report was not intended to be a mere 
restatement of the humanitarian intervention debate.  It widened its focus from military reaction to 
crises, to include the prevention of crises and post-conflict rebuilding; and it also noted that the 
responsibility of the international community to protect individuals when their state fails to do so can 
be fulfilled using economic, political and legal, as well as military, means (ICISS, 2001, p.19).  In relation 
to the primary responsibility of the state for its people, the understanding of how best to fulfil this 
requirement of responsible sovereignty relies on the same liberal philosophical underpinning as the 
7 
arguments put forward by scholars such as Teson in favour of humanitarian intervention.  The report 
expresses the view that it is ‘first and foremost the responsibility of sovereign states’ to prevent harm 
to their people and that a ‘firm national commitment to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities 
for all citizens provides a solid basis for conflict prevention’ (2001, p.19) although the international 
community can help local efforts to identify triggers of conflict (2001, p.19).  In addition to ‘direct’ 
causes of armed conflict the report acknowledges the ‘root’ causes of conflict to be ‘poverty, political 
repression, and uneven distribution of resources’ which can be remedied by promotion of human 
rights, minority rights and representative political arrangements (2001, p.22).  In the event of national 
failure to ensure fair treatment and opportunities, the international community’s responsibility to 
react is triggered in relation to the developing crisis.  This reaction can encompass economic sanctions 
and diplomacy and the report stresses the importance of non-military reactions to crises (including, 
for example, the role of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in conflict prevention efforts 
through good governance campaigns (2001, p.27)); although it also acknowledges that sanctions can 
be a blunt instrument and, as such, it may be necessary to consider military reaction (2001, p.29).  
Once a state has broken down or abdicated its responsibility to protect its population, the international 
community must take on the responsibility to rebuild with an emphasis on ‘local ownership’ in building 
a durable peace based on good governance (2001, p.39).  The international community should 
undertake long term financial and physical commitments, including disarmament and rehabilitation of 
armed forces, criminal justice and the return of refugees (2001, pp.39-45).  Particularly in terms of 
prevention and rebuilding, the RtP takes a liberal approach to the constitution of domestic society 
which is best suited to carrying out its responsibility towards its citizens – good governance, 
demonstrated by democratic representation, fair treatment and fair opportunities for individuals.  
 
4 Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the 
problematic approach to justice 
This section will demonstrate problems with viewing justice as best achieved through the RtP’s focus 
on local crises of civil and political rights, especially when the international community uses military 
means to respond.  It will explore the vision of progress within the debates over humanitarian 
intervention and the RtP, and explore what this vision fails to address, in particular the potential role 
of the international community in creating conditions of injustice (whether resulting in crises or not) 
and the type of human rights which are considered most important in achieving justice. 
It will argue that claims of progress towards justice for individuals across the globe are overstated, 
because they tend to focus on military interventions in response to crises of civil and political rights 
and dismiss the importance of the socioeconomic realm in achieving justice for individuals.  This has 
the effect of presenting the ‘international community’ as striving to achieve justice for individuals 
across the globe rather than as being implicated in creating existing global conditions of injustice 
(whether they are related to particular crises of civil and political rights abuses or not).  Given the 
potential for socioeconomic inequality to be related to disorder, this impoverished conception of 
justice also has consequences for security as much as for justice.   
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Progress 
Commenting on the RtP’s conception of sovereignty as responsibility, Ramesh Thakur describes RtP in 
terms of an increasing consensus that ‘[i]ntervention for human protection purposes occurs so that 
those condemned to die in fear may live in hope instead’ (2006, p.251).  This emotive language is filled 
with the idea of the progress and development of the community of humankind in caring for each 
other as human beings, wherever they happen to live in the world (Orford, 1999).  The liberal notion 
of the evolution of humankind is evident in Wheeler’s description of progress from the Cold War’s 
refusal to accept humanitarian intervention as a legitimate action within international society to his 
claim that ‘international society became more open to solidarist themes in the 1990s’ (Wheeler 2000, 
p.285; Macfarlane, Thielking and Weiss 2004, p.977).  This is echoed by the RtP’s section on Emerging 
Rights and Practice, which describes states as becoming more concerned with justice for individuals, 
evidenced by the increasing number of human rights treaties and which views the concept of 
sovereignty as undergoing significant evolution (Evans, 2008, pp.11-16).  It is also reflected in 
international legal scholarship which views progress as having been made towards humanity in 
international law (Peters, 2009).  Kofi Annan’s speeches share this view that progress has been made 
towards a developing international norm of human protection and that the UN Charter is read 
differently now compared to how it was in 1946.  Whilst Annan acknowledges some ‘limitations or 
imperfections’ in the current interpretation of humanitarian intervention and the RtP (1999a), and 
Wheeler acknowledges that there is less solidarity in relation to the ‘holocaust of neglect’ that 
characterises other areas of world (economic) policy (2000, citing Shue 1996), both nonetheless see 
progress in international society’s focus on achieving justice for individuals.  The limitations and 
imperfections are seen as unfortunate, but not as a significant impediment in the seemingly inevitable 
movement towards justice in international society by ‘a humanity that cares more, not less, for the 
suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it’ (Annan 1999a).  
Criticisms of the RtP (and the UN’s endorsement of it) centre on the failure to address the issue of 
potential Security Council inaction – an operational criticism (Wheeler, 2005).  Wheeler also criticises 
Jack Straw’s belief in the potential for the RtP to have prevented Rwanda or Srebrenica, for his failure 
to understand the lack of political will, rather the lack of an ICISS Report, was the problem in these 
cases (2005).  However, in making this criticism, Wheeler does not take issue with the fundamental 
assumptions of the RtP – of the notion of justice as ‘doing something’ in response to crises caused by 
democratic faults at the local governmental level (see also Bellamy 2004, p.2; Zifcak, 2010).  This 
section contends that these limitations and imperfections are in fact a significant impediment to the 
progress made towards justice for individuals within international society because they are an integral 
part of the approach to justice within the humanitarian intervention debate and the RtP doctrine.  A 
doctrine that aims to enable the international community to respond better to mass atrocity crimes 
without a broad understanding of the complex relationship between poverty, inequality and violence 
is unlikely to succeed in its aims.  Furthermore, the increased attention on the importance and claimed 
success of the doctrine diverts public attention and effort away from other global problems. 
Who is Responsible for ‘Doing Something’ – and When? 
Posing the question as one of ‘do something or do nothing’ (Chesterman, 2003, p.108) – of being in 
favour of humanitarian intervention or of being one of ‘the defiant, the indolent, the miscreant’ 
(Glennon, 1999, p.7) who subscribe to an unreasonable theory of ethics which permits wholesale 
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slaughter (Teson, 2003, p.14) – makes it hard to disagree with those who advocate a right of 
humanitarian intervention in certain circumstances, only for the gravest of human rights abuses, with 
a careful checklist to help ensure that interventions have humanitarian credentials (Orford, 1997, 
p.447).  A good example of this language is Glennon, who argues that ‘[a] child saved from ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo by NATO's intervention is no less alive because the intervention was impromptu 
rather than part of a formal [legal] system’ (1999, p.5).  Characterising the debate in this way – either 
of the futility of the rules of non-intervention and non-use of force in the face of governmental abuse 
of citizens (eg Weiss, 2007, p.12; Teson, 2003) or of a government’s responsibility towards its own 
citizens – necessarily views the responsibility for human rights abuses as lying with the particular state 
in which the violence occurs.  This idea is also present in the RtP report, where the international 
community’s preventative role was perceived to be in helping to identify local triggers of conflict – and 
responding to these triggers with diplomacy, sanctions or military intervention (ICISS, 2001, p.19) – 
rather than in changing its behaviour towards other states.  Whilst claiming to overcome the deadlock 
between human rights and non-intervention, the RtP nonetheless echoes this sentiment in its 
association of the main problems faced by vulnerable populations – civil wars, repression and state 
collapse – with a national (not international) governmental commitment to fair treatment and fair 
opportunities (ICISS, 2001, p.11; p.19; Teson, 1995, p.342; Gordenker and Weiss, 1993, p.14; Reisman, 
1991, p.203).  Though the focus of the RtP was intended to be on the rights of the victims rather than 
the interveners, and though military intervention was only one of the options considered appropriate 
to protect people across the world, much of the report – some 13 pages – on the responsibility to react 
elaborates upon revised ‘just war theory’ criteria for judging the legitimacy of an intervention, as well 
as operational military issues.  Despite claiming that RtP moves the debate on from the intervention 
deadlock, Weiss goes on to say that ‘the acknowledgment by the 2005 World Summit (preceded by 
the work of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change) of RtP has reinforced the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as a policy option’ (Weiss, 2007, p.89), bringing the debate 
back to military intervention in response to national governmental failures – though in contrast to 
Thakur and Weiss, Bellamy focuses more on the need for ‘upstream’ conflict prevention (Bellamy, 2010, 
p.158).   
This avoids the question of the potential responsibility of the international community for some of the 
causes of violence within one state’s borders – it is assumed that the international community’s 
existing relationship with the state in question is ‘neutral’.  In other words, it assumes that the 
international community is currently ‘doing nothing’ – when in fact it constantly intervenes in the 
economic and political affairs of many states.  In general terms, Philip Alston argues that the focus on 
ad hoc interventions in response to civil and political crises allows the interveners to avoid supporting 
existing multilateral human rights promotion and protection regimes (1991, p.107).  Whilst of course 
those carrying out the acts in question are not without blame, this assumption places the state in 
question as the only cause of harm.  Specifically in relation to the Western representation of the Balkan 
crisis, Anne Orford argues that the key threats to internal justice and international peace were held to 
be at the local level, largely the product of historical ethnic tensions; and set against the local cause of 
threats, the international level was responsible for rescue – rather than being part of the cause (Orford, 
1997, p.444; Orford, 2003, p.18).   In contrast to this view of threats to justice for individuals, Orford 
points out the contribution made by the economic liberalisation project of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund to the increasing instability in, and eventual violent breakup of, the 
former Yugoslavia.  She notes that before the two international financial institutions’ (IFI) interventions 
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into the country, the different Yugoslavian provinces had been able to coexist peacefully with a degree 
of autonomy from the central government, without perceiving a need for full separation.  The IFIs 
required the central government to enact constitutional changes which increased centralised control 
at the expense of autonomous regions, as well as decreasing education opportunities and reducing 
constitutional protections for workers (Orford, 1997, p.453).  This led to a decrease in income per 
capita, increased unemployment and attendant social unrest, together with a perception within the 
various regions that independence would be necessary to be able to reverse the damaging social 
changes introduced by the central government and the IFIs (Orford, 1997, p.454).  Pre-existing 
nationalist sentiments had previously been managed effectively through regional autonomy, but were 
fuelled by the increasing sense of insecurity, instability and social exclusion resulting from the 
constitutional reforms and increased centralisation decreed by the IFIs.  This is a very different, and 
more complex, picture than that of purely local factions fighting for local reasons, with the only 
question about the international community being whether it should intervene to protect individuals. 
The conception of justice evident in the RtP and the humanitarian intervention debate thus places the 
blame for violence at the feet of local actors and places the responsibility to rescue individuals, after a 
crisis has occurred, in the hands of ‘enlightened states’ (Glennon, 1999, p.3).  Teson echoes this in his 
idea that our universal obligation to respect human rights might require us to rescue those who are 
victims of human rights abuses – but he does not view our obligation to respect human rights to be 
engaged earlier than the point of rescue.  Such a view of justice fails to consider whether we, in 
‘enlightened states’, might bear some responsibility for crises which develop in other states, through 
our prior relationship with the state in question. This can also be demonstrated with regard to Rwanda, 
where Belgium’s colonial policy of elevating Tutsis to senior economic positions at the expense of the 
Hutu population is said to have led to many of the ethnic tensions which were a causative factor in the 
genocide in 1994.  Similarly, Rwanda’s exposure to the international market in coffee and the economic 
problems in Rwanda caused by the collapse in coffee prices is also said to have contributed significantly 
to the tensions (Jones, 1995; Robbins, 2002, p.269; Verwimp, 2003).  Peter Uvin also points to the role 
of the international aid agencies and development programs in contributing to the ‘structural violence’ 
of poverty, inequality and humiliation in the name of helping Rwanda develop (Uvin, 1998, p.107; 
p.136; p.143).  Mamdani argues that colonialism in Rwanda and Darfur created ethnicity of racial 
differences which would not otherwise have existed in these countries; this ‘race-branding’ did not 
merely heighten tensions but created them in the first place (Mamdani, 2001, p.13; p.42; p.80; 
Mamdani, 2009, p.6; p.15; p.59; p.271).   Again, this is not to say that those carrying out acts of violence 
were not to blame, but any response to violence, such as proposed in the RtP, which ignores the 
broader context in which violence occurs cannot succeed in preventing such violence.  
Weiss’ argument of the existence of widespread support for RtP – because in consultations nobody 
asked for less intervention, they often wanted more – does not respond adequately to the question of 
what intervention, when and how, would best help individuals in need, not just from repression by 
their own government but by the international community which claims to be willing to rescue them.  
The next section builds upon the question of who is responsible for causing crises and for rescuing 
people, by addressing what sort of treatment of individuals is considered to be just or unjust. 
Justice Within and Between States  
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The conception of justice described in this paper conceives of serious injustices to be genocide, crimes 
against humanity, serious war crimes and mass murder – deliberate action by a (non-democratic) 
government against the civil and political rights of its people (Teson, 2003, pp.1-2; D’Amato, 1990, 
p.516; Rawls, 1999; Slaughter, 1995, p.509; Slaughter, 1997; Franck, 1992, p.88; Opongo, 2009).  
Holzgrefe and Keohane’s definition of humanitarian intervention refers to ‘fundamental’ human rights, 
implying that other human rights, which in theory exist by virtue of our humanity alone, are not 
actually fundamental to this humanity.  This definition is adopted by other scholars (Kahler, 2011; 
Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003; Malanczuk, 1993; Reisman, 1990, p.872; Meron, 1986).  These views of 
injustice are limited to the government’s failure to protect its people’s civil and political rights, such as 
the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of movement, freedom of thought and religion and 
the right to take part in public affairs and vote and be elected (ICCPR arts 6, 7, 12, 18 and 25).  Franck 
comments that, in relation to Haiti and Russia, ‘the international community vigorously asserted that 
only democracy validates governance’ (1992, p.47) which accords with Teson’s assertion that anarchy 
and tyranny are the worst forms of injustice because it is in these conditions that evils such as genocide 
are perpetuated (2003, p.9).  Rawls focuses more on the civil and political arena than socioeconomic 
issues in building his theory of justice: equality of civil and political opportunities can never be 
compromised, and increased socioeconomic equality is not a justification for civil and political 
inequalities (1999, p.61).  On the other hand, significant socioeconomic inequality is permissible 
provided the poorest members of society gain some benefit.  The RtP contains largely the same liberal 
conception of a government’s responsibilities.  One paragraph of the RtP does refer to the role of Cold 
War debts and the trade policies of richer countries in preventing poorer states from addressing some 
of the root causes of conflicts, such as poverty (ICISS, 2001, p.20).  But, as argued in section 3.2 above, 
the solution to this problem is seen to lie only in the promotion of national democratic participation 
and human rights (ICISS, 2001, p.10; pp.22-23), sidestepping the issue of the potential responsibility 
of significant parts of the international community for the poverty that is acknowledged to contribute 
to much of the violence in the world (Zizek, 2008; Bellamy, 2003; Galtung, 1996).  It is assumed that 
democratic participation and the strengthening of human rights at the national level will decrease 
poverty and increase peace; and therefore that there is no need to consider the extent of the 
international community’s duty towards non-citizens in relation to poverty and inequality.  Only six 
lines are given over to considering the potential ‘direct’ responsibility of the international community 
for socioeconomic development in poorer countries (rather than tying socioeconomic development to 
national political constitution) and the potential for this justice to help produce international stability 
and security (ICISS, 2001, p. 23 para 3.22; Chandler, 2004, p.62).  
The issues dealt with in the preceding two sections, of who is responsible for crises and what sort of 
abuses constitute the sort of crisis which requires intervention are, of course, related to each other.  
Hilary Charlesworth comments that ‘using crises as our focus means that what we generally take for 
“fundamental” questions and enquiries are very restricted’ (2002, p.377) and argues that this focus 
‘diverts attention from structural issues of global justice’ (2002, p.382) such as global poverty and 
health inequality.  Similarly, James Richardson contrasts the ‘negative’ political rights, such as freedom 
from torture, with ‘[a]rbitrary acts of violence against the underprivileged, or acts of omission such as 
the dispossession without restitution of those who inadvertently stand in the way of “development”, 
[which] are passed over with silence’ (1997, p.25).  Alex Bellamy contrasts ‘death by politics’ (state 
sponsored killing) with ‘death by economics’ (such as starvation), and argues that the latter is 
somehow seen as outside the interest or responsibility of international law and the ‘international 
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community’ (2003, p.332).  Bellamy makes the point that ‘structural violence’, rather than organised 
military violence, is the main contemporary problem facing humanity; and he concurs that focusing on 
the need for ‘intervention’ ensures that military interventions are perceived as discrete acts rather 
than a different part of the spectrum of the  international community’s ongoing interventions into 
‘problem’ states (2003, p.329).   
The problems identified above in the RtP and the humanitarian intervention debate do not just reflect 
the question of which human rights are most important, but of who owes human rights duties to 
whom in the world.  Teson does not deny that we, in State A, owe human rights duties to individuals 
in State B, but he views our obligation to respect these human rights to start at the point of rescue 
from violation of certain civil and political rights, rather than in how individuals from other countries 
are treated by the ‘international community’ whether in relation to crises or to more systemic issues 
which affect basic survival and subsistence, such as global health and poverty.  Henry Shue and RJ 
Vincent have both argued that the idea of ‘basic rights’ should include a right to subsistence in addition 
to civil and political rights.  An alternative focus on socioeconomic issues, together with the idea of 
wider responsibility towards justice for individuals beyond that of a government towards its own 
citizens, would consider international responsibility not just for crises such as the Balkans, but for 
global inequalities in access to food and health.  The scale and degree of suffering resulting from 
socioeconomic problems such as health and poverty are significant challenges to the RtP’s ‘negative’ 
rights focus.  Andrew Hurrell quotes the 1998 statistics of 588,000 deaths from war, 736,000 from 
social violence and 18,000,000 from starvation to highlight this point.   At the same time, 34 million 
people worldwide were suffering from AIDS and HIV, 1.2 billion people were suffering from 
malnourishment, and 2.4 billion people lacked basic sanitation (2003, p.42, citing Pogge, 2001; 
Charlesworth, 2002).  The General Comments issued by the Committee on Cultural, Economic and 
Social Rights, suggesting that all states must respect the economic, social and cultural rights of 
individuals in other countries, appear to go unnoticed compared to the importance of respecting civil 
and political rights through military interventions (General Comment No 12 para 36; No 14 para 39 
and No 15 paras 31, 33 and 34 all refer to the responsibility of all states parties to respect, protect and 
facilitate the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in other countries).  Seen in this light, 
Teson’s claim – that if an ethical theory permits wholesale slaughter it is not an ethical theory (2003, 
p.14) – somewhat misses the point.  Why should an ethical theory (or international law) prohibit the 
abuse of certain civil and political rights by a government but not other rights, including socioeconomic 
rights?  Why should an ethical theory (or international law) prohibit some forms of violence within 
states but permit prior interference by states and IFIs which can have dramatically destabilising effects 
on a state and increase poverty, inequality and violence?  Why should an ethical theory (or 
international law) prohibit Bellamy’s ‘death by politics’ but permit his ‘death by economics’ through 
starvation, malnutrition and lack of access to drugs?   
 
4 Conclusion 
This paper has considered the view of justice within debates over the concepts of humanitarian 
intervention and the resulting doctrine of ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ and has made three 
arguments about this view.  First, it has argued that injustice is perceived to be synonymous with large-
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scale abuses of civil and political rights and the denial of electoral democracy.  Socioeconomic rights 
are not viewed as being as important in achieving a just society in contemporary liberal doctrine.  
Second, the paper has argued that justice is perceived to be largely a domestic matter, such that 
individuals must be treated justly by their state (through civil and political rights) but – other than 
when the question of intervention arises – other states, or the ‘international community’, do not owe 
duties to non-citizens across the globe.  The state-citizen focus neglects a broader cosmopolitan 
conception of justice which considers all states to have responsibility to all individuals across the globe 
regardless of their citizenship.   
This is related to a third argument of the paper – that international peace and security work, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, has tended to focus on ‘acute’ crises of civil and political rights, which appear to be 
caused by local actors involved in mass atrocity crimes, at the expense of more ‘chronic’ systemic 
injustices relating to socioeconomic issues such as starvation, global health inequalities and poverty.  
In response to acute crises, justice is seen to require military intervention to halt the abuses and rescue 
individuals from their government.  This combination, of the civil and political content of justice and 
the restriction of who is responsible for treating individuals justly to the individuals’ own state, fails to 
respond adequately to the question of who is responsible for what injustices.  It also fails to respond 
to the question of when this responsibility arises.  It allows the international community to present 
itself as a promoter of justice across the globe and downplays the role played by the international 
community in contributing to both systemic conditions of socioeconomic injustice and also to the very 
crises for which the internationally community developed the RtP as a response mechanism.    
This paper has demonstrated some potential risks using the concept of ‘justice’ to promote a more 
interventionist, and more military, approach to the governance of international security.  In response 
to Annan’s quote at the start of this article, it is worth recalling Martti Koskenniemi’s warning that, 
according to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s ‘whoever says humanity wants to cheat’ (Koskenniemi 2005, 
p.116).  Even if members of the international community are not ‘cheating’ and are genuinely 
concerned about vulnerable populations, this paper has argued that the RtP is not the best way for 
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1 Glennon is presumably referring to the Security Council authorised peacekeeping (or quasi-peacekeeping) 
operations – UNMIH/Operation Uphold Democracy, UNOSOM/UNITAF and UNAMIR/Operation Turquoise – in 
response to crises in these countries.  The view that these operations halted the slaughter of civilians is 
extremely controversial (eg, Evans, 2008, p.11).   
2 Although then-Prime Minister Tony Blair actually listed national interest as one of his conditions in favour of a 
military intervention by Britain on humanitarian grounds, in opposition to most of the ‘just war’ based criteria 
offered for assessing the humanitarian credentials of particular interventions, which require a ‘right intention’ 
to do justice (Fixdal and Smith, 1998; Chesterman, 2003, p.9).   
                                                 
